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Abstract
Part I of this Note will review the influence of international law in early U.S. history as well as
the current practice of the U.S. Supreme Court in citing international law, and will briefly explain
how principles of international law are imported into U.S. courtrooms. Part II will examine com-
peting legal theories on the proper role for international law in U.S. constitutional interpretation.
Part III will argue that although it is proper for U.S. courts to reference international sources in
their decisions, the U.S. Supreme Court’s current articulation of how courts should do so is deeply
flawed. Part III will conclude by recommending a framework theory for how U.S. federal courts
interpreting the U.S. Constitution might properly utilize international law.
THE DICHOTOMY BETWEEN JUDICIAL
ECONOMY AND EQUALITY OF ARMS
WITHIN INTERNATIONAL AND
INTERNATIONALIZED CRIMINAL
TRIALS: A DEFENSE PERSPECTIVE
Geert-Jan Alexander Knoops*
INTRODUCTION CONVERGING OBJECTIVES BEFORE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS
The preservation of the principle of equality of arms is criti-
cal for the rule of law and indispensable for a law-based society.
Nowadays, this principle, as derivative of the overarching right to
a fair trial, has attained the status of a fundamental human rights
notion. On the international plane, the legal-political environ-
ment in which international and internationalized criminal
courts function brings greater attention to the credibility of
these institutions. To maintain this credibility and integrity,
these institutions should endorse several procedural mecha-
nisms to ensure that trials are conducted in accordance with the
principle of equality of arms. Because the prevalence of the
principle of equality of arms is instrumental in the protection of
individual rights of accused persons, it is an indispensable safe-
guard against abuse of powers, as well as for the maintenance of
separation of powers. International and internationalized crimi-
nal courts comprise organs and parties with competing interests.
At the same time, several principles applicable before these insti-
tutions can result in antagonistic positions and situations from
the perspective of the defense acting before these fora.
Recent practice before the International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia ("ICTY") displays a tension between
the principle of equality of arms and that of judicial economy. t
Although the latter does not have the same human rights stan-
* Geert-Jan Alexander Knoops is Professor of international criminal law at Utrecht
University, and defense counsel acting before the International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia ("ICTY"), International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda ("ICTR"),
and the Special Court for Sierra Leone ("SCSL"); he practices at Knoops & Partners
Advocaten in Amsterdam, the Netherlands.
1. See Daryl A. Mundis, From Common Law Towards Civil Law: The Evolution of the
ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 2 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 367, 374-76 (2001).
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dards as that of equality of arms, it is rooted in the Rules of Pro-
cedure and Evidence ("RPE") of international and international-
ized criminal courts. For instance, Rule 73ter of the ICTY RPE
endows the Trial Chambers of this ad hoc international criminal
tribunal with the authority to limit the length of time and num-
ber of witnesses allocated to the defense case.2
This Article considers the trend to effectuate judicial econ-
omy within international criminal trials juxtaposed with the prin-
ciple of equality of arms from the standpoint of the defense. It
focuses on this juxtaposition as exemplified in contemporary
case law of the ICTY. In addressing this position, the analysis in
this Article will build on the assumption that the interrelation-
ship between these two notions must be interpreted in light of
two cardinal parameters: first, the protection of the interests of
the defense, and second, the principle of independence and
non-political use of the notion of judicial economy.
I. ENSURING EQUALITY OF ARMS ON THE INTERNATIONAL
PLANE: DEFENSE SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS
On the international plane, the synergy between judicial
economy and equality of arms is of perennial importance to en-
sure a fair trial. Central to the principle of equality of arms is
that the defense in criminal cases is not unjustly put at a disad-
vantage compared to the position of the prosecution in terms of
time and facilities to prepare its defense case, as well as having
access to information material to the case.3 The European
2. See International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Seri-
ous Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the
Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, Rules of Procedure and Evidence [hereinafter "ICTY
RPE"], U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev. 34 (2005), at Rule 73ter(C) and (D); see also ICTY Statute,
Trial and Appeals Chamber Decisions and Judgments, and ICTY Press Releases, availa-
ble at http://www.un.org/icty; International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons
Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in
the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other
Such Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighboring States Between 1 January
and 31 December 1994, Rules of Procedure and Evidence [hereinafter "ICTR RPE"],
U.N. Doc. ITR/3/Rev. 1 (1995), at Rule 73ter(C) and (D); Trial and Appeals Chambers
Decisions and Judgments, and ICTR Press Releases, available at http://www.ictr.org;
Special Court for Sierra Leone, Rules of Procedure and Evidence (Mar. 7, 2003), at
Rules 73ter(C) & (D); Mundis, supra note 1, at 367-82 (discussing judicial economy).
3. See Amnesty Int'l, The International Criminal Court: Making the Right Choices Part II
- Organizing the Court and Ensuring a Fair Trial 53 (Position Paper No. 2, IOR 40/011/
1997).
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Court on Human Rights ("ECHR") has repeatedly stressed that
the basis of a fair trial as enshrined by Article 6(1) of the Euro-
pean Convention is that criminal proceedings should be adver-
sarial and that there should be equality of arms between the de-
fense and the prosecution.4 The ECHR has interpreted the lat-
ter element as encompassing the requirement that both parties
be given the opportunity to have knowledge of, and to comment
on, the observations filed and the evidence adduced by the other
opponent.
5
In the context of the ICTY, on the issue of equality of arms,
the Appeals Chamber has accepted that "the principle of equal-
ity of arms between the prosecutor and the accused in a criminal
trial goes to the heart of the fair trial guarantee."6 The ICTY
Appeals Chamber judges have held that at a minimum "equality
of arms obligates a judicial body to ensure that neither party is
put at a disadvantage when presenting its case," particularly
when it concerns procedural equity.7 International criminal
tribunals have so far not accepted the thesis that equality of arms
should also extend to financial resources.' This principle was,
therefore, not interpreted as encompassing the approach that
prosecution and defense should have equal access to financial
means to prepare and present their case.9 The question is
whether such approach complies fully with human rights norms.
The ECHR, in the case of Steel and Morris v. UK, was con-
fronted with a denial by the British authorities of free legal assis-
tance to two "London Greenpeace" associates who accused
McDonalds of "economic imperialism," i.e., destruction of
4. See, e.g., Dowsett v. United Kingdom, 314 Eur. Ct. H.R. 259, 41 (2003) ("It is a
fundamental aspect of the right to a fair trial that criminal proceedings, including the
elements of such proceedings which relate to procedure, should be adversarial and that
there should be equality of arms between the prosecution and the defence."); Edwards
and Lewis v. United Kingdom, 381 Eur. Ct. H.R. 98, 52 (2003) (stating the same).
5. See Brandstetter v. Austria, 15 Eur. Ct. H. R. 378, 61 (1991) ("[U]nder the
principle of equality of arms persons who were or could be called, in whatever capacity,
by the defence in order to refute the views professed by Mr Flack, should have been
examined under the same conditions as he was.").
6. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment, 44 (July 15, 1999).
7. Id. 48, 50; see also Prosecutor v. Oric, Case No. IT-03-68-AR73.2, Interlocutory
Decision on Length of Defence Case, 1 7 (July 20, 2005).
8. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kayishema & Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR 95-1-A, Appeals
Chamber Judgment, 63-71 (June 1, 2001).
9. See Prosecutor v. Ojdanic, Case No. IT-99-37-PT, Final Assessment of the Ac-
cused Ability to Remunerate Counsel, 1 14, 23 (June 23, 2004).
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rainforests and exploitation of children.1" Charged with a libel
suit (instigated by McDonald's), Steel and Morris petitioned for
free legal assistance.11 This request was rejected since, at that
time, such assistance was not available in libel cases within the
U.K. system.' 2 As a consequence, the two defendants were
forced to represent themselves in a procedure that took 313
daily court sessions, during which 130 witnesses were heard and
40,000 pages of evidence were adduced.1 3 Following their con-
viction by U.K. judges, Steel and Morris appealed to the ECHR,
claiming that the U.K. proceedings were conducted in contra-
vention of the principle of equality of arms relative to the ab-
sence of free legal assistance. 4 In its judgment of 15 February
2005, the ECHR upheld this complaint, saying that there was an
unacceptable "inequality of arms" now that the underlying pro-
cedure was complex and a considerable imbalance existed be-
tween the defense possibilities of Steel and Morris on the one
hand and McDonald's on the other. 15 Accordingly, the ECHR
held that Article 6 of the European Convention on Human
Rights was violated.16
The above considerations are relevant not only to equality
of arms on the procedural level, but also with respect to equality
in financial terms. An application for free legal assistance im-
plies the absence of financial resources to pay one's defense.
Such absence would be incompatible with the fair trial require-
ment of (international) criminal trials, particularly the rationale
of the principle of equality of arms, insofar that it would under-
mine the effectiveness of the defense. 7
These developments make it both important and timely to
take a closer look at the impact of the notion of judicial econ-
omy on the fair trial rights of the accused within international
and internationalized criminal proceedings.
10. See Steel & Morris v. U.K., 186 Eur. Ct. H. R. (Feb. 15, 2005); see also GEERT-JAN
ALEXANDER KNOOPS, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL AND INTERNATIONALIZED
CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 42-49 (2005) (discussing this judgment and its implications in
further detail).
11. See Steel & Morris, 186 Eur. Ct. H. R. (Feb. 15, 2005), 3.
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. See id.
15. See id. at 50; see also KNoops, supra note 10, at 45-49.
16. See Steel & Morris, 186 Eur. Ct. H. R. (Feb. 15, 2005), 72.
17. See infra notes 73-87 and accompanying text.
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II. CONCURRENCE OF EQUALITY OF ARMS AND JUDICIAL
ECONOMY IN THE LAW PRACTICE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS
A. The Practice of the International Criminal Tribunals: A Shift to
Controlling the Effectiveness of the Proceedings
Before looking into the emerging concurrence between the
notion ofjudicial economy and that of equality of arms, this Sec-
tion will examine the contents of the former principle. Both
before the international and internationalized criminal tribu-
nals, particularly before ICTY, the International Criminal Tribu-
nal for Rwanda ("ICTR"), and the Special Court for Sierra Le-
one ("SCSL"), a discernible shift in the trial practice is visible,
resulting in a more prominent emphasis on the supervisory role
that the trial judges may play in controlling the proceedings.1 8 It
can be observed that while the first trials before the ICTY were
mainly dominated by common law principles, more recent prac-
tice portrays a more intense level of control on the proceedings
by the Trial Chambers comparable to the level ofjudicial control
during the criminal proceedings in the civil law traditions.19 It is
clear that this shift and process result from the perception of the
international community that trials at the ICTY and ICTR are
too lengthy. Consequently, it is felt that a mechanism to redress
this situation would be attributing more authority to control the
proceedings to the Trial Chambers.2 ° As observed by Daryl
Mundis, this development has been ongoing, under the rubric
of improving case management, at least since the eighteenth ple-
nary of the ICTY judges in July 1998.21 As a result, both the
amendments of the RPE and the trial practice before the ICTY
and ICTR no longer endorse a system primarily driven by the
parties, typical for common law jurisdictions, but rather one in
which the (pre-)Trial judges feature in a more dominant and
active role, comparable to the juge dinstruction in civil law juris-
dictions.2 2
Several examples of this development arise. In the context
of this Article, the following two are mentioned:
18. See Mundis, supra note 2, at 367.
19. See id. at 368.
20. See id.
21. See id.
22. See id. at 368-69.
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(i) Two amendments were made to rule 90 of the ICTY RPE,
which governs witness testimony, in order to enable the Trial
Chamber to exercise more control over the mode and order
of examining witnesses and presenting evidence. Particularly
sub-Rule 90(G) was added, empowering the Trial Chamber
with this control in order to ascertain the truth and "avoid
needless consumption of time."2" Sub-Rule 90(H) (i) was ad-
ded in order to enable the judges to restrict cross-examina-
tion to subjects covered in the opposing party's direct exami-
nation, unless the Trial Chamber extends the scope of the
cross-examination. 24 Finally, Rule 90(H) (ii) was enacted in
order to avoid the necessity of recalling witnesses who can
provide evidence relevant to the case for the cross-examining
party.2
5
(ii) A second example of this tendency towards a civil law ori-
ented form of judicial control and economy are the promul-
gated Rules 73bis and 73ter, which clearly envision pre-trial
case management. 26 Sub-paragraphs (C) of these Rules en-
able the Trial Chamber to reduce the number of witnesses if
the Trial Chamber considers the expected testimony to be cu-
mulative.2 7 In effect, these sub-rules attribute to the Trial
Chambers wide powers as to how the parties decide to pre-
sent and prove their cases. These mechanisms clearly re-
present a form ofjudicial control in order to "economize" the
trials, similar to civil law traditions.28
In this context, it is worth noting that similar considerations on
effective case management and judicial economy have been
promulgated by the judges of the International Criminal Court
("ICC"). Pursuant to Article 52 of the ICC Statute, the eighteen
ICC Judges have drawn up regulations in order to implement
the ICC Statute and the RPE of the ICC.2' These regulations will
23. ICTY RPE, supra note 2, at Rule 90(G); see also Mundis, supra note 2, at 372.
24. See id.
25. See ICTY RPE, supra note 2. Rule 90(H) (ii) reads that "[i]n the cross-examina-
tion of a witness who is able to give evidence relevant to the case for the cross-examin-
ing party, counsel shall put to that witness the nature of the case of the party for whom
that counsel appears which is in contradiction of the evidence given by the witness." See
Mundis, supra note 2, at 372.
26. See Mundis, supra note 2, at 372.
27. See ICTY RPE, supra note 2, at Rule 73bis and 73ter; see also Mundis, supra note
2, at 372.
28. Mundis, supra note 2, at 372.
29. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 52(1), U.N. Doc. A/
CONF/189/9, reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 999 (1998); see also Regulations of the Court, U.N.
Doc. ICC-BD/01-01-04 (May 26, 2001).
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be crucial to the "routine functioning" of the ICC and the con-
duct of trials.3" Even more than the Judges of the ICTY and
ICTR, the ICC Judges are endowed with considerable (investiga-
tive) autonomy and power to control the proceedings." In line
with the notion that the ICC Judges will play an active role in
running the trials is their incentive to manage intensively the
cases, which are before the Court. An example of this judicial
role as to the case management of ICC trials can be found in
Regulation No. 54 of the ICC Regulations.3 2 The Regulation en-
tails an exemplary list of orders the ICC Trial Chamber may issue
while organizing the trials. Such orders, which also clearly focus
on endorsement of judicial economy, can extend to:
(a) The length and content of legal arguments and the open-
ing and closing statements;
(b) A summary of the evidence the participants intend to rely
on;
(c) The length of the evidence to be relied on;
(d) The length of questioning of the witnesses;
(e) The number and identity (including any pseudonym) of
the witnesses to be called;
(f) The production and disclosure of the statements of the
witnesses on which the participants propose to rely;
(g) The number of documents as referred to in Article 69,
paragraph 2, or exhibits to be introduced together with their
length and size;
(h) The issues the participants propose to raise during the
trial;
(i) The extent to which a participant can rely on recorded
evidence, including the transcripts and the audio-record of
evidence previously given;
(j) The presentation of evidence in summary form;
(k) The extent to which evidence is to be given by an audio-
or video-link;
(1) The disclosure of evidence;
(m) The joint or separate instruction by the participants of
expert witnesses;
(n) Evidence to be introduced under Rule 69 as regards
agreed facts;
30. See Hans-Peter Kaul, Construction Site for MoreJustice: The International Criminal
Court After Two Years, 2 AM. J. INT'L L. 370, 376 (2005).
31. See id. at 376.
32. See Regulations of the Court, supra note 29, at 54.
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(o) The conditions under which victims shall participate in
the proceedings;
(p) The defenses, if any, to be advanced by the accused.3
Significantly, the items under (a), (c), (d), and (g) directly re-
late to "economizing" the trials.34 Judicial economy was clearly
one of the parameters in the drafting process of the ICC Regula-
tions. In doing so, the ICCJudges, while implementing the prac-
tical experiences of the ICTY and ICTR, were led by the follow-
ing objectives:
1. To streamline trials as far as possible;
2. To avoid, as much as possible, long and detailed, and possi-
bly insufficiently substantiated, indictments with a multitude
of alternative or cumulative charges that would have to be de-
cided separately in the course of the trial;
3. To limit the average length of trials as far as possible;
4. To avoid crafting endless judgments extending to hun-
dreds of papers;
5. To prevent, wherever possible, trials from being hijacked
by the defendant - for example, through the option ofjudi-
cial appointment of defense counsel; and
6. To protect, above all, the rights of the accused and the
defense, including the accused's right to trial without undue
delay in accordance with Article 67, paragraph 1 (c).
These developments make it clear thatjudicial case manage-
ment of international and internationalized criminal trials, fu-
eled by judicial economy motives, is becoming an increasingly
important objective of the Judges of these courts. 6 A difficulty
that may arise, however, concerns the way this development re-
stricts fair trial rights, particularly constraining the principle of
equality of arms.
B. Challenging Judicial Economy and Prioritizing Equality of Arms:
The Oric Case
In the legal practice of the international and international-
ized criminal courts, several situations come to mind in which
competing interests emerge between equality of arms and the
33. See id.
34. See id.
35. See Kaul, supra note 30, at 376-77.
36. See Prosecutor v. Plavsic, Case No. IT-00-39&40/1-S, Sentencing Judgment, 5
(Feb. 27, 2003).
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notion of judicial economy. In Prosecutor v. Oric, the Appeals
Chamber of the ICTY, confronted with such a situation, gave pri-
ority to the principle of equality of arms.3 7 In the Oric case, after
the prosecution closed its case, the defense served notice of its
intention to call seventy-three witnesses while estimating that the
defense examination-in-chief would take 249 hours.38 The pros-
ecution in the Oric case had called fifty witnesses and had taken
roughly 260 hours of court time.3 9 The Trial Chamber rejected
Oric's proposed framework of the defense case. It held that a
number of areas of evidence had been "sufficiently addressed
during the prosecution case in a manner and to an extent which
in the Trial Chamber's opinion does not require any further evi-
dence on the part of the defense."4 Specifically, it held that the
following areas were sufficiently addressed:
The historical and political background that led to the
armed conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina in April 1992;
The large number of attacks by Bosnian Serb forces on
Bosnian Muslim villages within the geographical scope of the
indictment, including the wanton destruction and plunder of
Bosnian Muslim villages and hamlets and the laying of mines
by Bosnian Serb forces in and around destroyed Bosnian
Muslim villages and hamlets;
The killing and inhumane treatment of Bosnian Mus-
lims, whether civilians or non-civilians, by Bosnian Serbs or
Bosnian Serb forces;
The policy of 'ethnic cleansing' by Bosnian Serb political
or military authorities before, during and after the crimes
charged in the indictment, in and around Srebrenica;
The positive treatment of Serbs-whether civilians or
non-civilians, hostages or wounded, in Bosnian Muslim hospi-
tals-by Bosnian Muslims, unless relating to persons identi-
fied in Counts 1 and 2 of the Indictment;
The situation of Srebrenica during the period relevant to
the Indictment, namely the positioning of Bosnian Serb
forces in and around Srebrenica, and the isolation of
Srebrenica from the rest of Bosnia and Herzegovina while be-
37. Prosecutor v. Oric, Case No. IT-03-68-PT, Decision (June 25, 2003).
38. Id.
39. See id.; see also Prosecutor v. Oric, Case No. IT-03-68-PT, Decision on First and
Second Defence Filings Pursuant to Scheduling Order (July 5, 2005).
40. Prosecutor v. Oric, Case No. IT-03-68-PT, Decision on First and Second De-
fence Filings Pursuant to Scheduling Order (July 5, 2005).
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ing under constant siege and suffering from air and artillery
bombardment;
The influx of refugees in Srebrenica and the critical con-
dition under which the population of Srebrenica had to live
during the period relevant to the Indictment, to include food
and medical shortages, hygiene issues, security concerns, spo-
radic electricity and telecommunications shortages;
The genocide committed against Bosnian Muslims in
Srebrenica in 1995;
The military superiority of the Bosnian Serbs at the time
relevant to the Indictment, namely that the Bosnian Serbs
were better equipped militarily than the Bosnian Muslims
and that, in addition, the Bosnian Serbs benefited from the
support of the former JNA and from Serbia;
The Bosnian Military capacity in Srebrenica was largely
dependent on weapons that could be captured from the Bos-
nian Serb forces; and
The urgent necessity for Bosnian Muslims to attack vil-
lages and hamlets named in the Indictment in order to try
and secure food, medicine and weapons, for the purpose of
the survival of the Muslim population in Srebrenica. (This
limitation does not in any way mean that the Trial Chamber
does not require any further evidence that the Defence may
wish to adduce in relation to the aspect of military necessity
to engage in wanton destruction as alleged in Counts 3 and 5
of the Indictment) ;41
In addition, the Trial Chamber rejected the defense propo-
sal, saying that the defense case could be concluded with a much
shorter presentation of evidence than the schedule proposed by
Oric. 42 As a result, the Trial Chamber ordered Oric to file a new
witness list with no more than thirty witnesses and ordered that
the defense case had to be finished within two months.13 Ac-
cordingly, the prosecution was enabled to hear fifty witnesses-in-
chief over 100 days, while the defense was only allotted thirty
witnesses over twenty-seven days.44 Thus, the defense in the Oric
case was faced with two forms of restrictions fueled by judicial
economy views:
41. Id.
42. See id.
43. See id.
44. See id.
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(i) A first one as to the subject matter of the scope of the
defense case, and
(ii) A second one relating to the number of defense witnesses
and time of the defense case.
Both restrictions were set aside by the ICTY Appeals Chamber
upon an appeal by the Defense against these limitations.4 5
The next Section will address the reasoning of the Appeals
Chamber in light of the overall consequences of its decision for
the applicability of the principle of equality of arms within inter-
national criminal proceedings.
C. Equality of Arms As a Human Rights Protection Against Judicial
Economy Before International Criminal Tibunals
Both Articles 6(1) and 14(1) of the ECHR and ICC PR re-
spectively delineate the right to a fair trial, without explicitly
mentioning the principle of equality of arms.4 6 Yet, according to
case law of the ECHR, this principle forms part and parcel of the
overarching notion of a fair trial.4 7 As mentioned before, the
ICTY Appeals Chamber in Prosecutor v. Tadic adopted this view,
holding that "the principle of equality of arms between the pros-
ecutor and accused in a criminal trial goes to the heart of the
fair trial guarantee."4" Although no overall definition is to be
found on any of the mentioned human rights instruments, it is
accepted that at a minimum "equality of arms obligates ajudicial
body to ensure that neither party is put at a disadvantage when
presenting its case." 49 Within the case law of the international
criminal tribunals, it seems also accepted that the principle of
equality of arms only encompasses procedural equity, rather
than equity in financial resources between prosecution and de-
45. See Prosecutor v. Oric, Case No. IT-03-68-AR73.2, Interlocutory Decision on
Length of Defence Case, I 6, 9 (July 20, 2005).
46. See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, art. 6(1), opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222; see also International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [hereinafter ICCPR], art. 14(1), openedfor signa-
ture Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 172.
47. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, It
48-50 (July 15, 1999).
48. Id., 44; see also Prosecutor v. Oric, Case No. IT-03-68-AR73.2, Interlocutory
Decision on Length of Defence Case, 7 (July 20, 2005).
49. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, 48, 50
(July 15, 1999).
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fense.5 ° Yet, the seriousness of the charges and complexity of
the criminal case are important elements to determine the ex-
tent to which the principle of equality of arms may apply in a
certain case.5" Now that proceedings before international crimi-
nal tribunals involve the most serious crimes as well as most com-
plex criminal cases when compared to domestic criminal cases,
equality of arms is of perennial importance to ensure the fair-
ness of international proceedings. The ICTY Appeals Chamber
in the Tadic case acknowledged this, holding that "under the
Statute of the International Tribunal, the principle of equality of
arms must be given a more liberal interpretation than that nor-
mally upheld with regard to proceedings before domestic
courts."52
This implies that the principle of equality of arms should be
subjected to teleological interpretation depending on the nature
of the criminal proceedings at hand rather than as construed on
a rigid and prefabricated notion, such as on a presumption that
ab initio it would extend to equity in financial resources.53 Ac-
cordingly, its human rights protection underlies a flexible and
nuanced approach, balancing the accused's position against the
prosecution interests and those ofjudicial economy on a case-by-
case basis.
D. Equality of Arms: Practical Consequences for the Position of
Defense Before International and Internationalized
Criminal Tribunals
As to the practical implications of the human rights dimen-
sion of the principle of equality of arms, the ICTY Appeals
Chamber has set forth some guidelines, which are also of impor-
tance for future cases before international and internationalized
50. See Knoops, supra note 15, at 42-49.
51. See, e.g., Phillip v. Trinidad and Tobago, Communication No. 594/1992, Views
of the UNHRC, 20 Oct. 1998 [1998] IIHL 123 (Oct. 20, 1998) (holding that the ability
for the defense to prepare a murder case merely during one weekend prior to the
commencement of the trial amounted to a violation of the principle of equality of
arms).
52. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, 52
(July 15, 1999).
53. See Steel & Morris v. U.K, 186 Eur. Ct. H. R. (Feb. 15, 2005), 62 (Feb. 15,
2005).
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criminal tribunals.54
1. According to the interpretation of the ICTY Appeals
Chamber judges, equality of arms in terms of time and witness
allocation to the defense does not imply that an accused "is nec-
essarily entitled to precisely the same amount of time or the
same number of witnesses as the Prosecution."55 The principle
of equality of arms is functionally interpreted by the ICTY Ap-
peals Chamber in view of the specific tasks and functions of the
parties within an international criminal trial. This is expressed
in the following way: "The Prosecution has the burden of telling
an entire story, of putting together a coherent narrative and
proving every necessary element of the crimes charged beyond a
reasonable doubt."56 Yet, functionally seen, the defense position
and defense strategy in (international) criminal cases concen-
trates "on poking specifically targeted holes in the Prosecution's
case, an endeavor which may require less time and fewer wit-
nesses."
57
2. Hence, a second guideline emerges, namely the princi-
ple of proportionality, which governs the interpretative scope of
the principle of equality of arms as to both the defense and pros-
ecution positions. In paragraph 7 of the Oric case, it is said that
"a principle of basic proportionality, rather than a strict princi-
ple of mathematical equality, generally governs the relationship
between the time and witnesses allocated to the two sides."58
The criterion here is that of the "reasonably proportionality."59
3. The Appeals Chamber promulgates a teleological inter-
pretation of those procedural rules that are meant to endorse
judicial economy within international criminal trials. Particu-
larly, in the context of Rule 73ter of the ICTY RPE, which gives
the Trial Chamber the authority to limit the length of time and
number of witnesses allocated to the defense,6 ° the Appeals
54. See Prosecutor v. Oric, Case No. IT-03-68-AR73.2, Interlocutory Decision on
Length of Defence Case, 7 (July 20, 2005) (delineating equality of arms principles).
55. Id.
56. See id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Rule 73ter reads:
(A) Prior to the commencement by the defence of its case the Trial Chamber
may hold a Conference.
(B) In the light of the file submitted to the Trial Chamber by the pre-trial
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Chamber held that "such restrictions are always subject to the
general requirement that the rights of the accused pursuant to
Article 21 of the Statute of the International Tribunal6" be
respected. '6 2 The teleological element in this interpretation is
that in assessing the reasonableness of the time and facilities al-
located to the defense in preparing its case - in terms of "rea-
sonably proportional" - an objective standard or test has to be
applied by the Trial Chambers. In paragraph 8 of the Oric deci-
sion it is said that, when determining this reasonableness, "a
Trial Chamber must also consider whether the amount of time is
objectively adequate to permit the accused to set forth his case in a
manner consistent with his rights."6
4. As to the question of what "reasonably proportional" im-
plies, the Appeals Chamber interprets this criterion on the basis
of the subject matter of the particular case and, thus, seems to
combine the elements under (i) and (ii) mentioned at the end
of Section 2(b) of this Article. In paragraph 9 of the Oric deci-
sion, the Appeals Chamber judges require that in this regard the
Trial judges take into account the complexity of the remaining
issues" as to the subject matter of the (defense) case in order to
permit the defense "a fair opportunity to present (its) case."64
5. The element of the complexity of the subject matter of
Judge pursuant to Rule 65 ter (L) (ii), the Trial Chamber may call upon the
defence to shorten the estimated length of the examination-in-chief for some
witnesses. (Amended 17 Nov 1999, amended 12 Apr 2001)
(C) In the light of the file submitted to the Trial Chamber by the pre-trial
Judge pursuant to Rule 65 ter (L) (ii), the Trial Chamber, after having heard
the defence, shall set the number of witnesses the defence may call.
(Amended 17 Nov 1999, amended 12 Apr 2001)
(D) After commencement of the defence case, the defence may, if it considers
it to be in the interests ofjustice, file a motion to reinstate the list of witnesses
or to vary the decision as to which witnesses are to be called. (Amended 12
Apr 2001)
(E) After having heard the defence, the Trial Chamber shall determine the
time available to the defence for presenting evidence. (Amended 12 Apr
2001)
(F) During a trial, the Trial Chamber may grant a defence request for addi-
tional time to present evidence if this is in the interests ofjustice. (Amended
12 Apr 2001).
61. Statute of the International Tribunal, art. 21, May 25, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1192
(setting forth virtually the same fair trial guarantees found in Article 14 of the ICCPR).
62. Prosecutor v. Oric, Case No. IT-03-68-AR73.2, Interlocutory Decision on
Length of Defence Case, 1 8 (July 20, 2005).
63. Id. (emphasis added).
64. Id. 8.
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the case, as an argument that triggers equality of arms more
predominantly, seems especially to arise when specific defenses
are at stake. In the Oric case, the defense intended to hear wit-
nesses pertaining to the defense of military necessity. 65 This
means that an inherent disproportion between the prosecution
and defense in terms of allocation of time and witnesses can be-
come unreasonable when a rather complex defense is to be
raised by the accused. In the Oric case, the accused was only
allotted by the Trial Chamber thirty witnesses and twenty-seven
days of testimony, whereas the prosecution was allocated time to
hear fifty witnesses over 100 days of testimony.6 6 The Appeals
Chamber concluded that this allotment to the defense is "not
remotely proportional to the time that was allotted to the prose-
cution."6 7 This disparity is especially flagrant "given the com-
plexity of the issues at stake, particularly regarding military ne-
cessity" so that "such disproportion cannot be justified. 6
6. In line with the above mentioned guideline, restrictions
by the Trial Chamber of judicial economy as to the subject mat-
ter the defense wishes to address in its defense case should also
be extensively interpreted and assessed in light of the "reasona-
bleness" of the defense case. Although the Trial judges, under
Rule 73ter, have discretionary power to restrict the subject mat-
ter scope of the defense case,6 9 such restrictions should be lim-
ited in the event the defense has unsuccessfully applied for an
acquittal under Rule 98bis of the ICTY RPE 7' based on a certain
substantive argument or defense. In paragraph 6 of the Oric de-
cision, the Appeals Chamber holds that (judicial economy) limi-
tations of the subject matter of the defense case, imposed by the
Trial Chamber, "(were) unreasonable in light of the fact that the
defense of military necessity may play a central role in Oric's de-
65. Id. 9.
66. See Prosecutor v. Oric, Case No. IT-03-68-AR73.2, Interlocutory Decision on
Length of Defence Case, 9 (July 20, 2005).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. ICTY RPE, supra note 2, at 73ter.
70. Rule 98bis reads: "At the close of the Prosecutor's case, the Trial Chamber
shall, by oral decision and after hearing the oral submissions of the parties, enter a
judgement of acquittal on any count if there is no evidence capable of supporting a
conviction." ICTY RPE, supra note 2, at 98bis.
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fense on counts 3 and 5 of the indictment."'" As to the rele-
vance of Rule 98bis in this context, the Appeals judges opined
that:
Unless the Trial Chamber decides in his favor on those
counts and issues a formal acquittal under Rule 98bis, there is
simply no way tojustify restricting Oric from presenting infor-
mation regarding, at a minimum:
- the military situation, broadly construed, throughout the
Srebrenica region, including the placement of Bosnian Serb
forces, equipment, and artillery; the isolation of Bosnian Mus-
lim forces; and the alleged military superiority of Bosnian
Serbs at the time relevant to the indictment
- The allegedly desperate situation of the region's Bosnian
Muslim population
- The alleged reliance of Bosnian Muslims on weapons that
could be captured from Bosnian Serb forces
- Any facts that could cast non-trivial doubt on the credibility
of prosecution witnesses. 72
Examining the Oric Decision, one can say that in this way,
Rule 98bis may provide the defense an important procedural
mechanism to limit the exercise and applicability of judicial
economy pursuant to Rule 73ter.
III. EQUALITY OF ARMS VIS-A-VIS INVESTIGATION AND
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE
A. Equality in Resources, Logistics and Investigations: Practical
Consequences for Defense Before International
Criminal Tribunals
Equality of arms in financial terms, i.e., the ability for de-
fense lawyers to have access to sufficient funds, was addressed in
Prosecutor v. Milutinovic.73 In that case, the defense was seized of
a confidential "motion for additional funds" filed by the defense
of Dragoljub Ojdanic seeking an order directing the registrar to
allocate additional funds for pre-trial preparation.7 ' The de-
71. Prosecutor v. Oric, Case No. IT-03-68-AR73.2, Interlocutory Decision on
Length of Defence Case, 6 (July 20, 2005).
72. Id.
73. Prosecutor v. Milutinovic, Case No. IT-99-37, Decision on Motion for Addi-
tional Funds (Jul. 8, 2003).
74. Id.
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fense argued that several particularities justified such additional
funding: the scope of the case, the nature of the accused's de-
fense, and the extended and complex legal issues involved.75
The Trial Chamber of the ICTY in its "Decision on Motion for
Additional Funds" of July 8, 2003 denied this motion, saying
that, while accepting the Registrar's position that it is open to a
certain flexibility in considering requests for additional re-
sources, the defense should demonstrate "exceptional circum-
stances" or "events beyond the influence of the defense" if such
requests are to be granted.76 The judges held that no such cir-
cumstances were ascertained. In particular, two arguments were
advanced by the Trial Chamber for this ruling:
(i) It reasoned that the current legal aid system of the ICTY,
which provides for a flat fee (lump sum) for the pre-trial stage
for all indigent accused before the ICTY, taking into account
the complexity of the cases, should be interpreted in light of
both the need to ensure full respect for the rights of all indi-
gent accused and the efficient use of the limited resources of
the ICTY's legal aid system.
(ii) The Tribunal held that counsel who have agreed to re-
present indigent accused before the ICTY "are fully aware of
the system of remuneration for assigned counsel, including
the basis for calculating the costs of legal representation (...)
and the maximum allotment for the pre-trial stage according
to the particular circumstances of the case." 77
Therefore, within the system of the ICTY and ICTR, the princi-
ple of equality of arms apparently has a different connotation
and meaning when it comes to equality of means and resources.
The ICTR even went further when saying that equality between
the parties as a fundamental right "shall in no way be interpreted
to mean that the Defence is entitled to the same means and re-
sources as available to the Prosecution." 78
The practical consequences of this approach were envi-
sioned by the "Interim Report on the SCSL" of April 2005 issued
by the U.C. Berkeley War Crimes Studies Center.79 On page 14,
75. See id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Prosecutor v. Kayishema & Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR 95-I-T, Judgment, 60
(May 21, 1999).
79. Sarah Kendall & Michelle Staggs, Interim Report on the Special Court for Sierra
Leone, U.C. BERKELEY WAR CRIME STUDIES CENTER, Apr. 2005, at 14.
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the following two paragraphs (subheaded "Defence, Equality of
Arms") draw the attention:
The court's own website defines equality of arms as a
'reasonable equivalence in ability and resources of Prosecu-
tion and Defence.' In practice, these two branches of the
court are quite different in terms of their administrative struc-
tures and available resources: unlike the independen.t OTP
[Office of the Prosecution], the Defence Office falls under
the umbrella of the Court Registry. Employees of the OTP
are salaried employees of the Court, whereas defence teams
are independent contractors who bill hourly, subject to the
oversight of the Principal Defender. Although the Prosecutor
stated that he does not believe the resource allocation be-
tween the prosecution and the defence is unfair, some mem-
bers of the defence have questioned whether the principle of
"equality of arms" is being meaningfully upheld at the Special
Court.
In light of the prosecution's burden of proof, it would be
inappropriate to make direct comparisons in all instances to
determine the adequacy of funds afforded the Defence Office
and the individual defence teams. While the Special Court is
not strictly bound by the precedents of the ad hoc tribunals, it
frequently takes guidance from judgments and rulings from
the ICTY and ICTR, and the ICTR has established that
"equality of arms ... does not necessarily amount to the mate-
rial equality of possessing the same financial and/or personal
resources." Even when applying the standard of "reasonable
equivalence" adopted by the court, however, the Principal
Defender and members of some defence teams were able to
give examples of where they felt the defence was clearly
prejudiced: areas of particular concern included disparities in
logistical support, such as transport and office resources, as
well as discrepancies in investigation and expert witness budg-
ets.
8 0
As to the question of whether equality is ensured with re-
spect to logistical support and investigations, the mentioned
Berkeley report contains the following references:
Logistical Support
While the Principle Defender noted that some condi-
tions for defence counsels had improved fairly consistently
80. Id. at 14.
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during her time in office, the current conditions under which
the Defence Office and the defence teams operated were still
thought to be less than adequate. Some defence teams al-
leged that the office resources afforded to the defence were
minimal when compared with the OTP; which in some cases
hampered the ability of teams to effectively prepare for trial.
The Registrar has noted that the defence teams at the Special
Court were perceived to be comparatively as well equipped or
more equipped than their counterparts at the ad hoc tribu-
nals. However, the court's own benchmark of "reasonable
equivalence" is not based on an inter-tribunal comparison,
but on how resources are shared within the institution of the
court itself. Although many of the specific needs of the de-
fence have been and are continuing to be addressed, there is
a broader perception within the defence that the prosecution
has access to substantially greater material advantages.
Investigations
The use of investigators in international tribunals forms
a pivotal part of both the prosecution and the defence cases.
Investigators from the OTP's investigations section have
worked closely with the OTP's legal team to refine target lists,
establish leads and uncover the background to crimes com-
mitted during the Sierra Leonean conflict to provide the
OTP with the information it needed to draft the first indict-
ments and through the prosecutions phase. Some of them
will continue to assist the prosecution during the defence's
case and the rebuttal case at the trial stage. Investigators
from the defence teams are charged with following up on the
veracity of the statements and testimony of OTP witnesses, es-
tablishing leads for potential defence witnesses, and recover-
ing any evidence that may further support the relevant de-
fence team's case. While it is fair to expect that the investiga-
tion resources allocated to the prosecution would exceed that
of the defence, the discrepancies between the two budgets
have been raised as an "equality of arms" concern by some
members of the defence. The Defence Office has advocated
for the addition of international investigators and lengthier
contracts for national investigators.
According to information received from the Principal
Defender, the Defence Office budget for investigations for fis-
cal year 2004/05 was less than half the amount allotted to the
OTP for investigation-related travel alone. However, the Reg-
istrar has commented that as prosecution cases draw to a
close, more emphasis will be placed on the defence budget.
2005] JUDICIAL ECONOMY AMD EQUALITY OF ARMS 1585
The recently released budget for fiscal year 2005/6 reflects
this shift: defence travel for investigations is approaching its
equivalent in the OTP budget, and the investigations budget
is more than double that of the previous year. The Registrar
seems to have adopted a pragmatic and malleable approach
to defence budgeting given the constraints within which he is
working, and in some instances the Principal Defender has
been provided with the flexibility to shift funds from one area
of the budget to another.
Although some members of the defence continue to ex-
press dissatisfaction with the way in which resources are allo-
cated within the court, the Registry has attempted to remain
in an ongoing responsive relationship to the needs of the de-
fence. The existence of the Defence Office itself is a novel
development, which, if managed effectively, could amount to
a significant gain for the recognition of the rights of the ac-
cused in international criminal tribunals.81
These comments are reinforced by the Human Rights Watch re-
port titled 'Justice in Motion: The Trial Phase of the Special
Court for Sierra Leone," published in November 2005.82 The
conclusions of this report as to the issue of having access to re-
sources still reveal several areas of concern from the perspective
of equality of arms for defense:
Despite these advances, funding of two areas essential to the
preparation and presentation of defense cases - expert wit-
nesses and international investigators - may prove insuffi-
cient. Defense counsel and court staff told Human Rights
Watch that they believe that currently allotted amounts for
the defense expert witness budget for 2005-2006 are inade-
quate. The Defence Office requested approximately three
times what was ultimately allotted in the 2005-2006 budget for
defense consultants and experts. While the notion of equality
of arms between the prosecution and defense does not mean
precise equality of resources, it is notable that substantial dis-
parities exist between financial allotments for the defense
and prosecution in this area.83
Similar concerns stem this report as to the ability of defense
teams to have access to defense investigators:
81. Id. at 14-15.
82. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, JUSTICE IN MOTION: THE TRIAL PHASE OF
THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE (2005).
83. See id. at 15.
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Defence Office staff and defense counsel have expressed simi-
lar concern about lack of funding for investigators. Prior to
its April 2005 mission, Human Rights Watch was told that ac-
cess to investigators by defense teams has improved over time,
with defense teams having access to the full-time assistance of
national investigators plus limited access to the assistance of
an international investigator. Given the importance of inves-
tigation to preparation of the defense, and ongoing demands
for investigation as additional information is disclosed
throughout trial, the opportunity to secure some assistance of
international investigators is significant. Consistent with
these developments, the Defence Office requested funds for
2005-2006 to cover the services of an international investiga-
tor for up to two months for each defense team, in addition
to the full-time services of national investigators. However,
the 2005-2006 budget allots less than half the amount the De-
fense Office requested for investigators.
When Human Rights Watch researchers raised concerns
over the limited allocations for defense expert witnesses and
investigators in April 2005 in Freetown, we were told that the
budget does not necessarily reflect the total amount that may
be made available for all areas; some areas may extend into
the next budget cycle and there may also be funds remaining
from the previous budget cycle, which ended on June 30,
2005. In follow-up discussions, Human Rights Watch was also
told that the budget is constructed based on anticipated
amounts, but that there is flexibility; funds can be found to
address needed areas and there is a commitment by the court
to ensuring reasonable needs by the defense. Human Rights
Watch was also told that the principal defender has been in-
vited recently to meet with Registry staff to discuss needs in
these two areas so that any appropriate redeployments can be
considered.
Detailed budgeting for all potential operational needs
throughout the court is a difficult task, especially when re-
sources are scarce. However, particularly with the departure
of the court's first registrar, Robin Vincent, relying on the
flexibility of the Registry to ensure adequate funding for key
areas for the defense poses some concern. 84
This Human Rights Watch report, therefore, recommends ade-
quate funding for both defense investigators and expert wit-
nesses.
84. See id. at 15-16.
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Although it is clear that the prosecutorial burden of proof
before international criminal tribunals may, to some extent, jus-
tify a higher budget as opposed to that of the defense, the funda-
mental nature of equality of arms as a human rights principle
must at least be interpreted as ensuring an approximate equality
in financial terms.8 5 The inference from the fact that the prose-
cution is required to meet the requisite burden of proof, may
not amount to a substantial imbalance in financial, logistical,
and investigative resources between the parties.86 After all, put-
ting a defense case before an international criminal tribunal re-
quires that the defense is able to invoke its arguments and estab-
lish criminal law defenses by a "preponderance of evidence. 87
B. Equality of Arms and Access to Documents of Governmental or
International Organizations
Can the principle of equality of arms be affected by the ac-
cessibility of the defense to potentially exculpatory materials in
the possession of governments and international organizations?
Quite often, the prosecution is given access to such materials
while the defense lacks the same powers.88 Such a situation
arose before the SCSL with respect to detention and military
records of one of the accused in possession of the governmental
authorities of Sierra Leone.89 Disclosure thereof could be deci-
sive in establishing an alibi defense of the accused. Confronted
with absence of cooperation on the part of the military authori-
ties of the Government of Sierra Leone to disclose these docu-
ments, the Trial Chamber of the SCSL issued an order that the
Government provide the defense with these documents.9" In its
underlying motion, the defense heavily relied on the principle of
equality of arms.91 Ultimately, access to these materials was
85. See RICHARD MAY & MARIEKE WIERDA, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL EVIDENCE 271
(2002).
86. See id.
87. See, e.g., GEERT-JAN KNOOPS, DEFENSES IN CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL CRIMI-
NAL LAw 225-28 (2001) (discussing this "preponderance of the evidence" burden).
88. See MAY & WIERDA, supra note 85, at 271.
89. See Prosecutor v. Kanu, Case No. SCSL-04-16-PT-091 , Decision on Defense Mo-
tion in Respect of Santigie Borbor Kanu for an Order Under Rule 54 with Repect to
Release of Exculpatory Evidence (June 1, 2004).
90. See id. at 11.
91. See id. at 2.
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given on the basis of Rule 54 of the RPE.92
In Prosecutor v. Simic, the ICTY preceded on this issue by
granting the defense access to ICRC materials, which was only
disclosed to the tribunal and prosecution.9" The ICTY relied
upon Article 21(1) of its Statute, saying that all persons shall be
equal before the Tribunal.94
Yet, an imbalance between the parties before international
criminal tribunals seems to exist. For instance, the agreement
between the United Nations ("U.N.") and the Government of
Sierra Leone95 provides in Article 17(1): "The Government shall
cooperate with all organs of the Special Court at all stages of the
proceedings. It shall, in particular, facilitate access to the Prose-
cutor to sites, persons and relevant documents required for the
investigation. '"96 Yet, the fact that this agreement only provides
that the Government of Sierra Leone is obliged to "facilitate ac-
cess to the Prosecution to sites, persons and relevant documents
required for the investigation, 1'' 7 without including the position
of the defense, implies that the defense has no independent po-
92. Sierra Leone RPE Rule 54 reads: "At the request of either party or of its own
motion, a Judge or a Trial Chamber may issue such orders, summonses, subpoenas,
warrants and transfer orders as may be necessary for the purposes of an investigation or
for the preparation or conduct of the trial." SCSL RPE, supra note 2, at Rule 54.
93. See Prosecutor v. Simic et al., Case No. IT-95-9, Decision on Application by
Steven Todorovic to Re-Open the Decision ofJuly 27, 1999, 22 (Feb. 28, 2000) (stat-
ing that "equality of arms [and] also common fairness" require access to information);
see also Prosecutor v. Kordic and Cerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2, Decision on Application
by Mario Cerkez for Extension of Time to File his Respondent's Brief, 7 (Sept. 11,
2001) (observing "principle of equality of arms has been given a liberal interpretation
in its application to the Tribunal's procedures") (citing Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No.
IT-94-1-A, Judgment, 52 (July 15, 1999)).
94. See Prosecutor v. Simic et al., Case No. IT-95-9, Decision on Application by
Stevan Todorovic to Re-Open The Decision ofJuly 27, 1999, 29 (Feb. 28, 2000) (ICTY
Statute Art. 21 mandates equality of prosecution and defense); see also Prosecutor v.
Kordic and Cerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2, Order for the Production of Documents by
the European Community Monitoring Mission and its Member States, at 2 (Aug. 4,
2000) (observing ICTY Statute Art. 21 provides right to a fair trial, including equal
access to specified documents).
95. Agreement between the U.N. and the Government of Sierra Leone on the Es-
tablishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, 2178 U.N.T.S. 138 (Jan. 16, 2002).
96. See id., Art. 17, sec. 1.
97. See id.; see also SCSL RPE, supra note 2, at Rule 66 (providing limited defense
access to prosecution materials); Special Court for Sierra Leone, Practice Direction on
Disclosure by the Prosecutor Pursuant to Rule 66 of the Rules of Procedure and Evi-
dence of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (Feb, 23, 2004) (stating prosecution shall
disclose informaiton pursuant to Rule 66), available at http://www.sc-sl.org/documents.
html.
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sition equal to that of the prosecution when it concerns having
access to sites, persons and relevant documents required for the
defense case.
The defense before the SCSL, therefore, is not entitled to
directly have access to witnesses on the same footing as prosecu-
tion. Hence, in order to ensure equality of evidentiary sources
and cooperation, it is crucial that international criminal tribu-
nals assume an active role in order to redress this inherent im-
balance.98
IV. PITFALLS AND DANGERS OF JUDICIAL ECONOMY
WITHIN INTERNATIONAL TRIALS
Human rights courts and committees have developed a
rather sophisticated view on the scope of the principle of equal-
ity of arms from the defense perspective. For international and
especially internationalized or mixed criminal tribunals, the as-
sessment of the boundaries of this principle is relatively new. In
particular, before the latter tribunals, which have a restricted life
span, such as the SCSL and Khmer Rouge Tribunal ("KRT"),
the occurrence of the notion of judicial economy - pressured
by these time-limited mandates - and that of the principle of
equality of arms for the defense, will present a dichotomy.
Internationalized criminal tribunals operate with limited
budgets and low levels of commitment. Thus, their effectiveness
can be questioned.100 This implies that the pressure on these
tribunals will be considerable to complete their tasks within the
prescribed time limits imposed by the international community.
It is observed that these tribunals require substantial commit-
ments of funds voluntarily donated by States, quality personnel,
and political will to contribute to international criminal jus-
98. See MAY & WIERDA, supra note 85, § 8.28 (observing that more active role of
trial chamber in international criminal tribunals "can assist to redress any imbalance
between the parties").
99. See Agreement on the Special Court for Sierra Leone, supra note 95; see also
Agreement between the United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia Con-
cerning the Prosecution under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed during the Pe-
riod of Democratic Kampuchea, available at http://www.cambodia.gov.kh/krt/pdfs/
Agreement%20between%20UN%20and%20RGC.pdf (last visited Feb. 10, 2006).
100. See Sylvia de Bertodano, Current Developments in Internationalized Courts, INT'LJ.
INT'L CRIM. JUST. 226, 244 (2003) (calling 2002 "a disappointing year for progress in
trials of international crimes in national and internationalized courts").
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tice. 1 Hence, the principles of judicial economy and that of
equality of arms will easily collide within proceedings before in-
ternationalized courts. The question is whether the former no-
tion should necessarily prevail over the latter due to the compli-
ance with the time limits in the lifespan of these courts. Judicial
economy is sometimes motivated by the argument that interna-
tional trials should be conducted without undue delay."' 2 This
argument is, however, a moot one.
First of all, the legal status of the notion ofjudicial economy
cannot be equated with that of equality of arms - the latter be-
ing qualified as a fundamental human rights notion enshrined
by Articles 6(1) and 14(1) of the ECHR and International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR"), respectively.10 3
Secondly, pursuance of judicial economy in that defense rights
are restricted in the way as displayed in the Oric case, can ulti-
mately affect the legitimacy of international and international-
ized criminal trials. 10 4 As noted by Daryl Mundis, "efforts to fur-
ther limit the choices of the defense, as a means of improving
effective case management, should be pursued only with great
caution, since they have a potential to seriously hinder the right
of the accused to a fair trial pursuant to Articles 20 and 21 of the
(ICTY) Statute.' 10 5
V. EQUALITY OF ARMS BEFORE INTERNATIONAL AND
INTERNATIONALIZED COURTS: A
STRUCTURAL INEQUALITY?
It may be said that equality of arms in its full scope will prob-
ably never be achieved as the financial procedural and investiga-
tive facilities allocated to prosecution and defense are structur-
101. See id. (observing "limited budgets and low levels of commitment" result in
ineffective internationalized courts).
102. See, e.g., MAY & WIERDA, supra note 85, § 8.11 (observing early international
criminal tribunals strictly opposed undue delay).
103. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
open for signature Apr. 11, 1950, C.E.T.S. No. 005; see also International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1969, U.N.T.S. 171.
104. See Mundis, supra note 2, at 370; see also SEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE IN-
TERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE PROSECUTION OF PERSONS RESPONSIBLE FOR SERIOUS VIO-
LATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARLAN LAw COMMITrED IN THE TERRITORY OF THE
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA SINCE 1991, A/55/273-S/2000/777, 7 (noting that increased case
load threatens ICTY's ability to try the accused in a reasonable time).
105. Mundis, supra note 2, at 378.
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ally and inherently unequal when it concerns trials before inter-
national and internationalized tribunals.
First, the prosecution is already capable of starting its inves-
tigation and taking witness statements in most cases one to two
years prior to the issuance of an indictment. 10 6 The defense,
therefore, comes only into play after a considerable amount of
evidence and material has been obtained. Mindful to the differ-
ent responsibilities and tasks of prosecution and defense in an
international criminal trial, it cannot be denied that this situa-
tion amounts to a disadvantage for the defense, especially when
the defense faces an accused who pleads not guilty.
Second, particularly with respect to trials before internation-
alized courts that are meant to adjudicate on region conflicts
such as in Sierra Leone and East Timor, one of the fundamental
problems the defense faces forms the structural disadvantage in
effectively getting access to witnesses dispersed over the prov-
inces.1 7 Most often in this type of conflict, the prosecution has
the ability to initiate outreach programs far earlier than the de-
fense. 0 8 Outreach programs are focusing on disseminating to
the wider public - especially those civilians living in the prov-
inces of a region or country affected by a conflict - the pur-
poses and functioning of a specific international or mixed tribu-
nal, which is established to try international crimes related to
that conflict.1"9 In this way, prosecution and defense may obtain
cooperation of witnesses and build their case. For instance,
before the SCSL, a specific budget is allocated to the prosecu-
tion and defense to conduct outreach programs throughout the
106. See, e.g., ARCHBOLD INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURTS PRACTICE, PROCEDURE
AND EVIDENCE (Rodney Dixon et al., eds., 2003) §§ 6-33 to 6-35 (discussing prosecu-
tion's pre-indictment investigative powers).
107. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, JUSTICE IN MOTION, supra note 82, at 15-16 (calling
defense access to investigative staff insufficient).
108. See, e.g., Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Art.
18, U.N. Doc. S/25704 at 36, annex (1993) (granting prosecution authority to initiate
investigations "ex-officio or on the basis of information obtained from any source");
United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor Regularion 2000/30, UN-
TAET/REG/2000/30, §24.1 (amended) (allowing prosecutor to present indictment
upon conclusion of investigation).
109. See Adama Dieng, International Criminal Justice: From Paper to Practice - A Con-
tribution from the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda to the Establishment of the Inter-
national Criminal Court, 25 FoRDHAM INT'L L.J. 688, 699 (2002).
1592 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 28:1566
whole territory of Sierra Leone.1 Yet, the prosecution was fac-
tually enabled to effectuate these outreach programs as of 2002,
whilst the defense teams - which were only appointed as of the
midst of 2003 - were able to set up programs more than a year
later.'11 This means that the defense teams of the nine detain-
ees before the SCSL were de facto put in a disadvantageous posi-
tion with respect to the effectiveness of outreach programs.
Since the prosecution had a considerable time advantage of
more than one year, considerable numbers of witnesses were al-
ready approached and enlisted for the prosecution's case." 2
Third, in terms of staffing and financing international and
internationalized criminal courts, a structural inequality can be
detected. For instance, the 2005-2006 budget report on the reg-
istrar of the SCSL comprises a staffing table for each organ of
the SCSL. 1 3 The total number of prosecution members is forty-
five, including eighteen investigators, whereas the Defense Of-
fice is staffed with eleven individuals, excluding the defense law-
yers who are contracted to represent the nine detainees."' In
principle, every defense team has the right to contract one inves-
tigator as opposed to the eighteen investigators on which the
OTP may rely." 5 Of course, it can be argued that the OTP has to
deal with the investigation in nine cases that are currently pend-
ing before the SCSL. Yet, this does not take away the imbalance
with respect to the position of the defense now that prosecution
investigators may share the information from the various cases
and prosecution trial attorneys before the SCSL repeatedly use
the same witnesses in the three trials.
The responsibilities of international criminal tribunals may
create conflicting pressures on both the creators and judges.
This pressure may produce a stalemate. To establish such tribu-
nals for the sake ofjustice on a predetermined budget risks hav-
ing, in the end, no justice delivered in terms of endorsing fair
trial rights. Yet, the alternative of not vesting such tribunals
110. See THIERRY CRUVELLIER, INT'L CTR FOR TRANSNAT'L JUSTICE, THE SPECIAL
COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE: THE FIRST EIGHTEEN MONTHS 8-9 (2004).
111. See Rupert Shilbeck, Building the Fourth Pillar: Defence Rights at the Special Court
for Sierra Leone, 1 EsSEx HUM. RTS. REv., 66, 79-84 (2004).
112. See id.
113. See Special Court for Sierra Leone, SCSL Budget 2005-2006 (presented by
Robin Vincent, Registrar), available at www.sc-s.org/Documents/budget2005-2006.pdf.
114. See id.
115. See id.
2005] JUDICIAL ECONOMY AND EQUALITY OF ARMS
bears the risk of having no justice delivered at all. Thus, a formi-
dable challenge rests on the international community, responsi-
ble for the establishment of these tribunals, to contemplate the
consequences of these conflicting pressures in order to achieve a
fair application of the principle of equality of arms.
CONCLUSION: SAFEGUARD AGAINST POLITICALLY
MOTIVATED APPLICATION OF JUDICIAL ECONOMY
Both the notions of judicial economy and that of equality of
arms are indispensable to properly conduct international and in-
ternationalized criminal trials. Yet, unlike the former notion,
the principle of equality of arms represents a more structural
and fundamental safeguard to facilitate a fair trial at this level.
Preservation of, and respect for equality of arms, at the mini-
mum in a procedural sense, does not depend on endorsement
of judicial economy, at least from the perspective of defense fair
trial rights. The described dichotomy between the principle of
equality of arms and the notion of judicial economy remains
largely undetermined by the case law of the international and
internationalized criminal courts, notwithstanding the Appeals
Chamber's ruling in the Oric case. 16 This ruling brought some
clarification as to the fair trial limitations of the "asymmetric"
effect of 'judicial economy" for the defense, particularly in terms
of equality of arms. This clarification certainly provides impor-
tant guidance regarding the interpretation of the RPE that are
promulgated to ensure judicial economy policy.
Yet, current practice before the international and interna-
tionalized criminal courts cannot take away the fear about a
politicized and non-independent application of such rules, from
the perspective of the defense. The best way to resolve this fear
is to - on a case-by-case basis - review these particular rules
and interpret them not in a grammatical manner but rather
from the perspective of the protection of human (defense)
rights. A broad interpretation of the RPE pertaining to the con-
cept of judicial economy, such as Rule 73ter of the ICTY RPE,
carries the risk that such norms may potentially be used as a tool
to prioritize the political agenda of member States or the U.N. as
to the budgetary restraints and mandates pertaining to interna-
tional and internationalized criminal tribunals. The preliminary
116. See Prosecutor v. Oric, Case No. IT-03-68-PT, Decision (June 25, 2003).
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purpose of the principle of equality of arms is, therefore, to re-
duce the risk of politically motivated applications of the concept
of judicial economy.
